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Incentive provision is a central question in modern economic theory. During the run up to 
the financial crisis, many banks attempted to encourage loan underwriting by giving out 
incentive packages to loan officers. Using a unique data set on small business loan officer 
compensation from a major commercial bank, we test the model’s predictions that 
incentive compensation increases loan origination, but may induce the loan officers to 
book more risky loans. We find that the incentive package amounts to a 47% increase in 
loan approval rate, and a 24% increase in default rate. Overall, we find that the bank loses 
money by switching to incentive pay. We further test the effects of incentive pay on other 
loan characteristics using a multivariate difference-in-difference analysis.  
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“Despite the vast outpouring of commentary and outrage over the financial crisis, one of 
its most fundamental causes has received surprisingly little attention. I refer to the 
perverse incentives built into the compensation plans of many financial firms, incentives 
that encourage excessive risk-taking with OPM -- Other People's Money” 




The current financial crisis has led to much debate about incentive provision at 
financial institutions.
1 While the causes of the mortgage meltdown are complex, many 
would argue that perverse economic incentives are an important factor contributing to the 
current mess. Specifically, many banks in recent years gave out incentive packages to 
encourage loan underwriting. While such financial incentives were designed to promote 
greater employee efforts, anecdotal evidence suggests that they also encouraged loan 
officers to make more loans to unqualified borrowers.
2  In this paper, we study the effects 
of an incentive pay based on loan origination by formally modeling two tasks loan 
officers perform: their efforts to assess loan quality and their loan origination decisions. 
The model allows us to derive testable implications regarding the approval rates, default 
rates and other characteristics of booked loans under an incentive pay. In addition, we 
provide answers to two central questions in the incentive provision literature: 1) do 
incentives matter, that is, do agents respond to contracts that reward performance? 2) are 
these responses in the firm’s interest, or do such contracts induce perverse incentives?    
We employ a unique data set from a large, national commercial bank on loan 
officer compensation, which allows us to empirically study loan officers’ incentives and 
loan performances. In January 2005, the management of the bank switched half of the 
loan officers from fixed-wage compensation contracts to a new incentive compensation 
                                                 
1 See Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) and Bebchuck and Spamann (2009). 
2 See Morgenson, Gretchen, “Was there a loan it didn’t like?,” New York Times, November 1, 2008.     3
package based on loan origination. We examine the status of more than 30,000 small 
business loan applications received at the bank from 12 months before the compensation 
change to 12 months after and the performance of more than 140 loan officers. The 
effects of such incentive pay on approved loan characteristics are dramatic, and are 
largely consistent with economic theory.  
For this purpose, we develop a theory of loan officers’ incentives to assess loan 
quality, with emphasis on the predictions that pertain to the compensation changes at this 
bank. Consistent with our model’s predictions, we highlight the following empirical 
results: 
1)  A switch to incentive pay increases the loan approval rate by 47%, the total 
number of booked loans by 44%, the average dollar amount of booked loans 
by 45%, and the default rate by 24%. 
2)  The average amount of time spent per loan applications drops by 21%.  
3)  The above effects of incentive pay are stronger for larger and longer maturity 
loans, and loans that contain more soft-information. 
4)  Although the bank shares the gains in more loan origination, the large amount 
of loan defaults results in a welfare loss for the bank.  
These results are in line with the model we developed on loan origination, which 
takes into account the loan officer’s career concerns and different loan information 
regimes. The loan origination process starts when a loan officer receives a loan 
application that contains observable information. The loan officer then studies the credit 
risks of the borrower and investigates the loan quality by exerting costly effort. We 
assume that the probability of revealing the loan quality depends on the loan officer’s   4
unobservable effort. She then makes a loan origination decision based on the information 
she reveals. This information may be hard or soft information. One distinction between 
hard information and soft information is that soft information is a signal that cannot be 
verified ex post (Petersen, 2004). We study cases where the loan officer makes the loan 
approval decision based on unverifiable information, or soft information, and where she 
makes the decision based on verifiable information, or hard information. With soft 
information lending, the loan officer may lie about the information she reveals in order to 
approve the loan.  
Much of the literature on incentive provision has focused on the role of output-
based contracts in solving the agency problem for the principal: if effort cannot be 
monitored, output-based contracts can address the moral hazard problem induced by 
agents’ hidden actions. We show that the effectiveness of such contracts in mitigating 
moral hazard depends crucially on whether hard or soft information is used in the loan 
origination decision. If hard information is used, incentive compensation works well to 
align the loan officer’s incentive to search for good loans. High-powered incentive 
compensation, in this case, motivates loan officers to work harder at assessing loan 
quality and writing more and better loans. If, however, the lending decision is based on 
soft information, incentive compensation may distort the loan officer’s incentive to 
“overbook” risky loans. This conclusion is consistent with Inderst (2008).
3 
The loan officer’s career concern, on the other hand, also plays an important role 
as a disciplinary device in soft-information lending. The loan officer trades off a 
monetary bonus with her career concern. In this case, incentive compensation may distort 
                                                 
3 Inderst (2008) studies loan officers’ incentive to generate new loan applications and their loan origination 
decisions under soft- and hard-information lending. The focus is more on bank competition and the optimal 
lending standard.   5
the loan officer’s effort, depending on the strength of the incentives given. Indeed, we 
find that younger loan officers respond to the incentive pay by booking more loans, 
without sacrificing loan quality, compared to older loan officers whose loans have a 
much higher default rates under the incentive pay. This is consistent with the view that 
younger agents have more career concern at stake.  
This paper offers new insights into the process of originating small business loans 
by focusing on the incentives faced by loan officers and how this affects the underwriting 
process. The conflict of interest between the loan officers and the bank has rarely been 
studied in the literature, with the exception of Udell (1989). By surveying 140 mid-
western banks, Udell finds that banks increase monitoring of their loan officers when the 
bank explicitly compensates loan officers for generating more new business. Our model 
provides a theoretical foundation for this result.  
Our paper also relates to a broader literature on incentive provision to individuals 
in organizations, which is a central issue in modern microeconomics (see Prendergast 
(1999) for an extensive survey). In the context of compensation contracts, the provision 
of incentives usually takes the form of pay-for-performance, or piece-rate contracts 
(Lazear and Rosen (1981); Stiglitz (1981); Holmstrom (1982); Green and Stokey (1983)). 
Researchers have analyzed the choice of one compensation system over another (see 
Gibbons (1998), literature review). In particular, piece-rate payment has the effects of 
inducing appropriate effort levels and sorting workers across jobs (Lazear (1986)). 
Alternatively, economists also argue that such incentive contracts may give rise to 
dysfunctional behavioral responses, where agents emphasize only those aspects of 
performance that are rewarded (Baker (1992)).  For example, agents may choose quantity   6
over quality. Following Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) and Baker (1992), this incentive 
problem has become known as multi-tasking, where agents will allocate effort toward 
those activities that are directly rewarded and away from the uncompensated ones. Loan 
officers’ compensation provides a perfect opportunity for studying multi-tasking. 
Incentives are provided on the dimension of quantity and not on quality. We show that 
distortion arises for soft-information lending in particular.  
Due to the lack of data, there has been little work documenting the effect of 
compensation policies on performance. Lazear (1996) studies the performance of auto 
windshield workers and documents the incentive and worker selection effects of piece-
rate contracts. Paarsch and Shearer (1996) provide similar evidence using data on 
Canadian tree planters. It is important to bear in mind that these studies document cases 
in which the jobs carried out are relatively “simple,” in the sense that 1) performance is 
easily measured and 2) the quality is easily observed. The loan officer’s job in our paper 
is much more complicated than those in the previous papers. Most importantly, the 
quality of the loan officer’s work is not easily measured due to unobservable randomness 
of other factors. Our data set is richer, in the sense that it allows us to further analyze the 
effects of incentive contracts on multi-tasking behavior of the agents. In addition to 
providing empirical evidence for the existing theories, we add to the banking literature by 
studying how loan officers’ incentives affect the process of small business loan 
underwriting.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a model of incentive 
compensation. Section 3 provides a detailed description of the data. Section 4 provides 
empirical results. Section 5 concludes.    7
 
2. Model Description 
The primary motivation behind the incentive scheme is to increase worker efforts. 
A central role that loan officers play in the process of loan origination is to assess loan 
quality. In particular, loan origination depends on a significant amount of soft and 
subjective information from loan officers (Udell (1989)). In this section, we study the 
loan officer’s choice of effort to detect bad loans and her loan origination decisions under 
the incentive pay. We find conditions under which such incentive scheme gives rise to 
loan officers’ responses that are not in the bank’s interest.
 4 
A loan application is characterized by (Y, T, q), where Y denotes the requested 
loan amount, T is the time to maturity and q captures the ex-ante observable risk profile 
of the loan. Assume that q is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. There are two types of loans: 
a loan is “good” with probability q, and “bad” with probability 1-q. A good loan is repaid 
with probability p—that is, with probability 1-p even a good loan may fail. A bad loan 
defaults with certainty. Therefore, the higher q, the lower the probability of default. In 
addition, we assume that the bank makes a profit on good loans only and loses money on 
bad and questionable ones.  
To focus on the loan officer’s choice of effort to assess loan quality, we model a 
risk neutral loan officer’s decision to exert unobservable effort, e, and her loan 
origination decision. The probability θ that the loan officer reveals the loan type depends 
on her effort e. With probability 1- θ, the loan type remains uncertain. We assume that 
θ’(e) >0, θ(0)=0 and θ(∞)=1.
 5  We also assume that  ) , 0 [ ) ( ' ∞ ∈ θ e   and  0 ) ( " > θ e .
6   
                                                 
4 See Inderst (2008) for an analysis of optimal compensation contracts.   
5 Assume that θ is continuous. Then the inverse function e(.) is continuous and e’(θ) > 0.    8
Assume that a compensation contract is given by a + b(Y), where a is the base 
salary and b(·) is the bonus based on the amount of  loans originated. Assume that b(Y) ≥ 
0, and  b’(Y) >0. For notional simplicity, we normalize a to zero.
7 In the case a loan is 
denied, the loan officer receives no bonus component. If a loan is booked, she receives  
b(Y) – e(θ) – ρc(T), 
where ρ is the probability that a loan defaults, and c(T) is the negative career 
consequences of a defaulted loan. Specifically, we assume that c(T) takes the functional 
form 
) ( ) (
T Ke T c
δτ − = , where K>0 is the negative career shock to the loan officer when a 
default occurs, and τ(T) is the expected default time of a loan with maturity T, and is an 
increasing function of T.
8  δ is the discount rate.  
We focus on a loan officer’s decision to assess loan quality under an incentive 
scheme that rewards her for loan originations. The basic game proceeds as follows: a loan 
officer reviews a loan application characterized by (Y, T, q). She exerts costly effort e, 
and reveals the loan type with probability θ(e). For soft-information lending, the loan 
officer has private access to information about the borrowing firm that is “hard to 
quantify, verify and communicate through the normal transmission channels of a banking 
organization.” (Berger and Udell (2002).) She can conceal, or lie about, the information 
she reveals. On the other hand, if lending is primarily based on hard information, the loan 
officer cannot conceal the information she reveals and this information is verifiable ex 
post by the bank. The loan officer then makes an approval decision and receives payoffs 
accordingly.  
                                                                                                                                                 
6 One such example of the functional form of e(.) would be e(θ)= tan(θ*π/2).  
7 In an optimal contract, a is set such that the loan officer’s individual rationality condition is satisfied. 
8 This assumption can be justified by a model with a constant Poisson intensity of default.    9
With hard-information lending, the loan officer no longer plays an active role at 
the loan origination stage, since only loans revealed to be good may be booked. The 
problem reduces to a pure moral hazard problem, in which the only decision factor is the 
loan officer’s hidden effort. Consistent with economic theory, incentive pay promotes 
greater effort without sacrificing the loan quality. We provide a formal analysis in 
Appendix A.   
 
2.1 Perverse incentives with soft-information lending 
In this section, we study the loan officer’s decisions in a soft-information lending 
regime. The loan officer makes a lending decision based on her privately observed soft 
information, which cannot be verified by the bank. She may lie about the soft information 
she reveals in order to book the loan. In this case, whether monetary incentives create 
perverse incentives depend on the loan officer’s career concern and the strength of the 
incentives.  
We analyze the soft-information lending problem in two steps. We first focus on 
the approval decision, then derive the loan officer’s optimal effort level. The loan 
officer’s approval decision now depends on the information revealed and privately 
observed by her: the loan type is good (G), bad (B), or no information is revealed, that is, 
the loan quality remains questionable (Q). In order for the loan to be approved, the loan 
officer may revise her subject input of the loan application’s risk rating downwards for a 
bad or questionable loan. If a loan is booked, the loan officer gets the following payoffs 
based on revealed types:    10
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  Depending on the loan officer’s career concern  and the size of the monetary 
bonus, which is tied to the amount of the loan requested, it may be in the loan officer’s 
interest to not only book the good loans but also the questionable ones. In other words, 
monetary bonus may induce her to take more risks for these loans.  
If the incentives are small enough or the loan officer’s career concern is large 
enough such that the she only writes good loans, we find that the effect of incentive 
contract is exactly the same as with the hard-information case: incentive compensation 
promotes effort without sacrificing loan quality. If the monetary bonus gets too large, 
such that the loan officer will accept any loan applications even the bad ones, we show 
that the loan officer has no incentive to exert effort and that incentive packages are purely 
costly to the bank. We discuss these two cases in more depth in Appendix B. 
We focus on the case where the loan officer approves both the good loans and the 
questionable ones, but her career concern is large enough that she wants to avoid writing 
bad loans. Recall that if no information is revealed, the prior assumption that the loan is 
good with probability q, in which case, the bank loses money on such loans. Such 
questionable loans cannot be booked with hard-information lending, nor does the loan 
officer have incentives to book such loans when the monetary incentive is small relative 
to her career concern. However, as the monetary incentives get large, the loan officer 
may find it profitable to write such loans at the bank’s expense. This is where an 
incentive pay may induce perverse incentives.    11
The question becomes when will the loan officer be incentized to write 
questionable loans? The loan officer will revise her subjective input for the loan quality 
upwards for a questionable loan when the following constraints are satisfied: 
. 0 ) ( ) (
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, 0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
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We next analyze the loan officer’s choice of effort under the above conditions. 
Recall that when the loan officer exerts costly effort e, with probability θ the loan type 
will be revealed, and with probability 1- θ its type remains questionable, in which case 
the loan is good with probability q, and bad with probability 1-q. The loan officer has 
incentive to book both the good loans and the questionable ones if the monetary incentive 
is large or when her career concern is relatively weak. The loan officer gets payoff 
qθ[b(Y) – (1-p)c(T)]+(1–θ)[ b(Y) – (q(1-p)+1-q)c(T)] – e(θ), 
yielding a FOC:   
). ( ' ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 (
) ( ' )] ( ) 1 ) 1 ( ( ) ( [ )] ( ) 1 ( ) ( [
θ
θ
e T c q Y b q
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  From the above FOC, we can derive the approval rate, the default rate of booked 
loans, and other comparative statics. We summarize these results in the following 
proposition.  All proves are in the appendix.  
 
Proposition 1 If the monetary incentive is large or the loan officer’s career concern is 
small, the loan officer will book a loan unless it is revealed to be bad. In this case,   12
1.  The loan officer’s effort level to investigate loan quality decreases with the 
loan amount, the time to maturity, the ex-ante score of the loan and the strength of 
monetary incentives, and increases with her career concern.  
2.  The probability of loan origination decreases with the loan officer’s effort, 
increases with the loan amount, the time to maturity, the ex-ante score of the loan, and 
the strength of monetary incentives, and decreases with her career concern.  
3.  The probability of defaults decreases with the loan officer’s effort, increases 
with the loan amount, the time to maturity, and the strength of monetary incentives, and 
decreases with her career concern. 
We see that monetary incentives induce preserve incentives in these that they 
reduce the loan officer’s effort to assess loan quality. The intuition is as follows. The loan 
officer receives a monetary bonus only when a loan is booked. Since both the good loans 
and the questionable ones are booked, her effort to investigate loan quality only affects 
her booking decision of bad loans, which she will not book weighing in her career 
concerns. In other words, the loan officer’s effort decreases the likelihood that she will 
book a loan and receive the monetary bonus. Career concern, on the other hand, serves as 
an effective disciplinary device and motivates the loan officer to exert effort to avoid 
booking bad loans.  
   Interestingly, the ex-ante quality of a loan, q, does not predict the likelihood of 
loan origination or the default probability of a booked loan. Taking the derivatives with 
respect to q to the FOC, we get  q e T c Y b ∂
∂ = − * ) ( ' ' ) ( ) ( θ θ . Since c(T) > b(Y), it is easy to 
see that the loan officer’s effort decreases with q. In this case, the loan officer increases 
her effort to investigate lower quality loans to avoid booking a bad loan. Although these   13
lower quality loans are more likely to be bad and will default with greater probability, the 
loan officer also spends more effort to investigate them and avoids making loan 
originations. Thus, there is no direct relationship between the score and the expected 
default probability. 
 
2.2 Empirical Implications 
In the previous section, we analyze whether incentive pay creates perverse 
incentives for loan officers by studying their choices of effort to investigate loan quality 
and their loan origination decisions. While the choice of effort is hidden, the probability 
of default, which decreases with the level of effort, is observable. We thus have the 
following predictions: 
Prediction 1 Under incentive pay, the likelihood that a loan is booked increases with the 
loan amount Y, the time to maturity T, and the ex-ante score q. 
Prediction 2 Under incentive pay, the default probability of booked loans increases with 
the loan amount Y and the time to maturity T, when the strength of monetary incentive is 
large. 
Prediction 3 The likelihood of booking a loan decreases with the loan officer’s career 
concern.  
  Our analysis on information verifiability and compensation schemes sheds lights 
on how incentives affect the subsequent loan performance based on the amount of soft 
information used in the loan origination process. We show above that with hard-
information lending, incentive compensation encourages loan officers to investigate loan   14
quality and to avoid booking bad loans. Only when information becomes unverifiable 
does a monetary bonus distort incentives.  
  Prediction 4 Both the likelihood of loan origination and the default probability 
are higher for more informationally opaque loans with soft-information lending than with 
hard-information lending.   
 
3. Description of the Market and Data 
3.1 The Loan Officer’s Job Function 
Loan officers play a central role in the process of loan origination. The process 
begins when the loan officers initiate contacts with the firms to determine their needs for 
loans. After the initial contact has been made, loan officers assist the clients through the 
process of loan application. The loan officer gathers personal and business information 
about the borrower and explains the different types of loans and credit terms available to 
the client. Loan officers then verify the basic information of the borrower to assess the 
creditworthiness of the borrower and the probability of repayment. Specifically, loan 
officers assign credit scores to the potential borrower and determine collateral 
requirements. A loan that would otherwise be denied may be approved if the client can 
provide the lender with appropriate collateral property pledged as security for the 
repayment of a loan. For a more detailed description of the process, see Agarwal and 
Hauswald (2007, 2008). 
Loan officer compensation usually takes the form of fixed payment salary or 
incentive plans based on loan origination. Neither of these compensation schemes is tied 
to loan repayment or failure and the eventual profitability of these loans. Such   15
compensation contracts may distort loan officers’ incentive and encourage them to make 
any loan, regardless of its quality. While bonuses based on loan profitability would have 
the advantage of giving direct incentives to search out good credit risks, such 
performance measure would also give the loan officers greater risk, because many things 
can happen to borrowers that are essentially unknowable when a loan is written. The 
additionally imposed risks on loan officers are costly to the bank through higher wages. 
Baker (2002) argues that the trade-off between risk and distortion in this case is made in 
favor of lower risk and higher distortion.  
 
3.2 Data from a natural experiment 
The data set used in this paper comes from a large, national commercial bank. 
Starting January 2005, the management of the bank implemented a new incentive 
compensation package for half of the small business credit services approval officers 
(henceforth referred to as the treated group). The other half of the loan officers remained 
on fixed wage (henceforth referred to as the control group). The selection of the loan 
officers was quasi-random. The management had multiple legacy portfolios as a result of 
earlier merger and acquisition activities over the years. They were broadly being 
managed under two legacy database management systems. The portfolio of loans under 
both these management systems had identical underwriting standards, geographical focus, 
portfolio management practices, and loss outcomes (see Table 3a and 3b). To evaluate 
the success of the incentive compensation package, the bank implemented the change on 
one of the management systems while leaving the other on fixed wage compensation.       16
The incentive package provides a “pay for performance” bonus opportunity based 
on individual results. Before that, all loan officers were paid a fixed salary. Specifically, 
loan officers will receive an annual bonus based on the percentage of new money 
applications booked compared to the previous year, the type of decisions made, and the 
timeliness of the decision.  The details of the incentive package are summarized in Table 
1 and 2. The goal of this program is to “recognize and reward those associates whose 
performance most aggressively contributes to the overall success of small business credit 
services,” and “to attract and retain outstanding talent.” 
The incentive plan comes with a quality assessment. In order for a loan officer to 
be eligible to participate in the incentive program, their total of unsatisfactory 
underwriting must not exceed 5% of total approvals, reviewed in a post approval review 
process.   
The data cover 12 months before the compensation change and 12 months after.  
To study the effects of incentive compensation on loan officers’ incentives and the 
implications for subsequent loan origination decisions and characteristics of the booked 
loans, we employ two control groups: data on loan officers and loans of the group before 
the implementation of the incentive plan, and data from the other half of the loan officers 
whose salary remained fixed during the same period. Data from the control group allow 
us to better control for macroeconomic fluctuations over this period. Our sample contains 
data on more than 140 loan officers and the status of 15,784 loan applications in the 
treated group and 14,484 loan applications in the control group. The data are summarized 
in Table 3 and Table 4. 
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4. Empirical Evidence 
4.1 Do incentives matter?  
4.1.1 Loan Origination Decisions 
Not surprisingly, loan officers are motivated to book more loans under the 
incentive pay structure. Table 3a summarizes the status of loan applications for both 
groups in year 2004 and 2005. While there is no apparent increase in the number of new 
applications from year 2004 to year 2005, the number of booked loans increases by 1,132 
in the treated group, a 44.4% increase.  Approval rate in the treated group goes up from 
32% to 47%, consistent with our model’s prediction.   
Also consistent with Prediction 1, in addition to booking more loans, loan officers 
in the treated group are booking larger loans and longer maturity loans. Table 3a shows 
that the average dollar amount of booked loans increases by $96,470, a 44.7% increase. 
Table 3d shows that loan officers are more likely to approve bigger loans than smaller 
loans and longer maturity loans than shorter maturity loans. The effect is stronger after 
the implementation of the incentive plan: Big loans, those with requested amount above 
$700,000, have an approval rate of 55% under the incentive pay, compared to an 
approval rate of 33% for small loans. Long term loans have a 52% approval rate 
compared to a 37% approval rate for short term loans.  
 
4.1.2 Are Loan Officers Booking Riskier Loans?  
One potential concern of paying piece rates is that quality may deteriorate. In our 
case, does a piece rate contract distort incentives in a way that results in loan officers 
booking riskier loans? The model suggests that loan officers have stronger incentives to   18
investigate and approve loan applications with inferior ex-ante quality. One observable 
key risk factor that lenders use to assess qualifying borrowers for loans is the loan-to-
value ratio (LTV). Our subsequent multivariate analysis also confirms that a higher LTV 
value predicts higher loan default probability. Table 3b shows that while the average 
LTV of loan applications decreased slightly from 2004 to 2005 in the treated group, the 
LTV of booked loans increases from 76.24 to 84.10, a 10.32% increase, suggesting that 
loan officers were booking riskier loans.  
Table 3c shows a noticeable increase in the number of booked loans secured by 
collaterals after year 2005 in the treated group. The average percentage of booked loans 
without collateral goes down by 13%, a 55% drop compared to the average percentage 
prior to the implementation of the incentive plan, whereas the pool of applicants without 
collateral does not change. Berger and Udell (1990) find that collateral is associated with 
ex-ante observably riskier borrowers and riskier loans. The increase in the percentage of 
secured loans adds to the evidence that loan officers are approving loans from riskier 
borrowers.  
On the other hand, Table 3b shows that the average business scores and personal 
scores of approved loans go up in year 2005, and the internal risk ratings go down. Since 
the internal risk ratings reflect a large amount of soft information possessed by loan 
officers, this implies that loan officers have been identifying safer borrowers since the 
implementation of incentive compensation (also see Agarwal and Hauswald (2007, 
2008)).  
 
4.2 Who respond to incentives and when?   19
As suggested in the literature, incentive compensation may have a sorting effect 
of attracting more able workers (Lazear (2000)). Table 4a shows that the treated group 
attracts younger loan officers and more male loan officers after year 2005, who are likely 
to be more aggressive in their career paths – the average age of the loan officers in the 
treated group goes down from 41 to 37, and the percentage of males goes up from 68% to 
74%. There is also evidence of higher turnover in the treated group, as it is reflected by 
lower average tenure.
9  
Indeed, in Table 5a, we find that loan officers in the age group 25-34 are most 
aggressive at approving loans, while they have the lowest default rates among all age 
groups. Consistent with our model, achieving a higher approval rate without sacrificing 
loan quality is possible if the loan officers put in more effort to investigate the loan 
quality. Thus, the evidence above suggests that younger loan officers, who are likely to 
have stronger career concerns, worker harder than older loan officers. This effect gets 
amplified by the incentive pay.   
  We find similar evidence for male loan officers compared to female loan officers. 
Table 5b reports that after the implementation of the incentive pay, the gap in the 
approval rate between male and female loan officers goes up. While the female loan 
officers also approve more loans under the incentive pay, the default rate among these 
loans is much higher than in year 2004, and higher than their male colleagues. This 
evidence is consistent with the literature that female workers have short careers, and thus 
less career concerns than males. In the context of our model, such loan officers are most 
                                                 
9 Our results are both qualitatively and quantitatively very similar if we have a constant pool of loan 
officers before and after the treatment period.   20
likely to have distorted incentives under the incentive plan, in the sense that loan quality 
deteriorates the most.  
  We find further evidence that loan officers’ career concern becomes an important 
disciplinary device under the incentive pay in our multivariate analysis.  
  A less studied question is the response time of the agents to incentive contracts. 
Do agents respond to incentives immediately, as assumed in the theoretical literature on 
incentive contracts, or is there a learning curve? In other words, if incentive contracts 
leave rooms for agents to game the compensation system, will agents respond to it as 
predicted by the rational theory immediately?  
  The analysis of this question also provides a robustness check for our results. That 
is, was the information leaked to the loan officers prior to the actual implementation of 
the incentive pay in January 2005 so that loan officers may hold back from approving 
loans before they can receive the bonus linked to those booked loans? If there was such 
an information leak and loan officers did hold back booking loans in year 2004, our 
results would be weakened.  
Table 6 provides a month by month break-down of the status of loan applications. 
We plot the loan approval status in Figure 1 and observe a significant increase in 
approval rate and a decrease in rejection rate since January 2005. Figure 2 shows that 
both the average dollar amount of booked loans and the percentage of loans booked 
increase since January 2005, and the structural change takes place in January 2005. 
Figures 3, 4 and 5 show similar structural breaks in January 2005 for LTV, days-spent-
per-loan-application, and internal risk rating.   21
In summary, we find evidence that loan officers respond immediately as predicted 
by economic theory to the incentive pay, and we find no evidence that loan officers hold 
back approving loans prior to January 2005.   
 
4.3 Does an incentive pay induce perverse incentives? 
Much of the study in the literature is on whether agents’ responses to incentive 
pay are in the firm’s interest. Our analysis and preliminary empirical results above show 
that incentive pay may create perverse incentives to loan officers by encouraging 
overbooking of inferior loans, especially for larger and longer maturity loans, whereas 
loan officer’s careern concerns serve as a good disciplinary device. We provide further 
evidence with a multivariate analysis.     
 
4.3.1 Multivariate Analysis 
We examine whether during the treatment period, (i) the treated loan officers are 
more likely to approve or decline loan applications; and (ii) the booked loans are more 
likely to default. We employ the standard logit model specification to estimate these 
models. 
Our results reveal that loan officers’ inputs of internal risk ratings, LTV of the 
loans, loan amounts, and collateral are important for loan officers’ approval decisions. 
Table 7a shows that these variables are statistically significant and marginally important 
for loan approvals. Consistent with our intuition, riskier loans and larger loans are less 
likely to be approved, whereas collateral requirements increase loan approval rates. 
Moreover, we see that the variable, Treated Dummy*2005 Dummy is significantly   22
positive and marginally large, indicating that the implementation of the new incentive 
package in the treated group increases loan approval rates. While larger loans possess risk 
of a greater loss, the implementation of the incentive plan encourages loan officers to 
book larger loans, consistent with our model’s prediction; we see in Table 7a that the 
variable, Log(loan amount requested)*treated*2005 is significantly positive. Similarly, 
loan maturity*treated*2005 becomes significantly positive, indicating that loan officers 
in the treated group are more likely to book longer maturity loans as predicted by the 
model.  
We further analyze the subsequent loan performance of approved loans by 
examining the default probability of the loans based on loan characteristics. The results 
are reported in Table 7b. We confirm that internal risk ratings, LTV of the loan, loan 
amount requested, and loan maturity are important factors in predicting loan defaults. 
Collateral requirements, however, decrease the probability that a loan defaults, consistent 
with the moral hazard view of collateral requirements. In addition, we also find that Days 
Spent per Loan is negative, suggesting that the longer a loan officer spends on a loan 
application, the less likely it will default. We can interpret the number of days spent on 
the loan application as a measure of the loan officer’s effort to investigate loan quality. 
The harder the loan officer works, the less likely it is that an approved loan will default. 
This variable becomes especially important after the implementation of the incentive plan. 
Furthermore, we see evidence that loan officers in the treated group are booking larger 
and longer maturity loans that are riskier and more likely to default. The variables Loan-
to-Value of the Loan * treated * 2005 and Loan maturity * treated * 2005 are both 
significantly positive.    23
We further study loan officer’s fixed effect on loan approval and default rates. 
Table 8 summarizes the results from logit regressions of loan approval decisions and 
defaults on loan officer’s characteristics. Consistent with our prior findings, internal risk 
ratings, LTV of the loan, loan amount requested, loan terms, and collateral requirements 
are the key risk factors that drive approval decisions and predict subsequent loan defaults. 
Moreover, Treated Dummy*2005 Dummy is highly significant in both regressions, 
suggesting that loan officers in the treated group are more likely to book loans in year 
2005, and that these approved loans are more likely to default.  
Our detailed micro-level information on loan officers allows us to study questions 
such as how the incentive plan interacts with loan officers’ career concerns. Our model 
indicates that loan officers’ career concerns serve as a powerful control mechanism that 
mitigates the distortion of incentives caused by monetary bonus. A loan officer with 
greater career concern will be more conservative in making loan approval decisions. We 
find evidence of this from the results in Table 8. Using loan officers’ ages and number of 
years on the job (tenure) as proxies for career concerns, we see that loan officers’ career 
concerns become significant after the implementation of the incentive plan in year 2005. 
The career concerns are insignificant on their own, but become significant after 
interacting with the treated dummy and the year 2005 dummy. Following previous 
literature, we argue that career concern is strongest when a person is just starting her 
career, thus tenure measures the reverse strength of career concern. We find that the 
marginal effects of Loan officer tenure * treated dummy * 2005 dummy and Loan officer 
tenure (sq) * treated dummy * 2005 dummy are 7.24% and 3.98%, respectively. That is, 
controlling for a loan officer’s age, the fewer years on the job, the less likely that she   24
books a loan. Interestingly, tenure does not predict default probability linearly. We see 
that the marginal effect of Loan Officer Tenure * Treated Dummy * 2005 Dummy on 
loan default probability is 6.77%. The positive number is consistent with our findings of 
loan officers’ approval decisions that the longer the tenure, the smaller the career 
concern, and thus, the more likely that the loan officer books riskier loans motivated by 
monetary incentives. Loan Officer Tenure squared, however, has the opposite effect in 
predicting loan defaults. Loan Officer Tenure (sq), Loan Officer Tenure (sq) * Treated 
Dummy, and Loan Officer Tenure (sq) * Treated Dummy * 2005 Dummy have negative 
marginal effects. In particular, the marginal effect of Loan Officer Tenure (sq) * Treated 
Dummy * 2005 Dummy is -1.91%, much larger than the other two, confirming that loan 
officers’ tenure is an important factor in loan approval decisions after the implementation 
of the incentive package. We interpret this as a “learning-on-the-job” effect. The longer 
the loan officer is on the job, the more experience she gains on detecting loan quality, 
thus, the lower the likelihood of booking a bad loan. This learning effect, however, 
becomes important only when the time on the job is sufficiently long.  
We also observe that Days Spent Per Loan*Treated Dummy * 2005 Dummy is 
marginally important for both the loan approval decision and loan default probability. We 
interpret Days Spent per Loan as a proxy for the loan officer’s effort to assess loan 
quality. We see that the longer the time spent reviewing the loan application, the less 
likely that it will be approved, and the less likely that the loan will default. In addition, 
the effect of this variable is large only after the implementation of the incentive plan 
among the loan officers in the treated group.   
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4.3.2 Soft-information vs. hard-information lending 
Our theoretical analysis suggests that whether incentive pay induces perverse 
incentives for loan officers depends crucially on the type of lending regime, soft-or hard- 
information lending. Hard information contained in a loan application is captured by its 
observable risk factors, such as Experian scores, LTV, loan amount, loan terms, and 
maturity, whereas the internal risk rating contains loan officers’ subjective input, much of 
which is soft information. Following Agarwal and Hauswald (2008), we capture the 
residual soft information collected by the bank by orthogonalizing the internal risk rating 
with the above set of publicly available information controlling for branch, year, and 
industry effects. Hence, we estimate the following regression: 
  i i i i u XPAR XCI ing IntRiskRat + + + = 2 1 0 β β β , 
where XCI contains the Experian business score and personal score, and XPAR includes 
other publicly available risk factors such as LTV, loan amount, loan terms, loan maturity, 
and personal and business collateral. We refer to the residual from the above regression 
as “Internal Risk Rating Residual.” 
  We then estimate the logit regression as in the previous sections by replacing 
Internal Risk Rating with the residual from the above regression. The results are reported 
in Table 9. We see that while the residual information itself is not significant in 
predicting default, it is significant for the treated group in year 2005. This suggests that 
under the incentive plan, loan officers book riskier loans that contain more soft 
information. This observation is consistent with the model’s prediction on the interaction 
between incentive compensation and soft information lending.    26
  Furthermore, we form quintiles based on the size of the Internal Risk Rating 
Residual for both the treated group and the control group in year 2004 and 2005, with the 
top quintile containing loans with the largest residual, or the greatest amount of soft 
information. Our theoretical analysis suggests that under the incentive pay, loan officers 
are more likely to make reckless approval decisions for loans that contain more soft 
information. For these loans, both the approval rate and the default rate are higher than 
those with mostly hard information. Indeed, Table 10 reports the ratio of the approval 
rates and the default rates of the loans in the highest quintile to those in the lowest 
quintile.  During the treatment period, loans that contain the greatest amount of soft 
information are 2.36 more likely to be approved than those that contain the least amount 
of soft information. Moreover, these loans are 3.05 times more likely to default than 
those with the least amount of soft information.  
  
4.3.3 Welfare Analysis 
Finally, did the bank profit from the incentive pay? Although there are more 
defaults, loan officers are indeed booking more loans, of which the bank can make a 
profit from the fees. To answer this question, we carry out a simple welfare analysis. 
Welfare = Volume × fees – Wages – Loss given default – other unobservables 
Here the unobservables include the externalities of not making a loan, the cost of 
funding for the bank, and utility loss by extending additional effort.   
The marginal welfare, therefore, is  
∆ welfare = increased volume × fees – increased wages – ∆ Loss given default 
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Table 4a shows that the average income of loan officers in the treated group 
increases by $6,597 from $42,422 to $49,019 from year 2004 to 2005. Under the 
incentive plan, $6,500 is amount of bonus that a loan officer gets if she reaches 100% of 
the performance goal (see Table 2). This suggests that the 100% goal may create a focal 
point for loan officers to aim for.   
Following industry standards, fees are assumed to be 2% of the loan originated 
and the loss given default is assumed to be 50% (see, Agarwal et. al. 2007). 
  Table 11 reports the marginal welfare of the incentive pay. We see that the bank 
experiences a loss of $6,880,446 in year 2005. The program was eventually discontinued 
in the first quarter of 2006 due to losses to the bank. 
 
5. Conclusion 
    A central question addressed by much research on incentive compensation has 
been whether incentive contracts provide the right incentives. In this paper, we propose a 
model that studies two tasks that loan officers perform in the loan origination process: 
their efforts to investigate loan quality and their loan origination decisions. Our model 
demonstrates that monetary incentives may distort loan officers’ incentives to identify 
bad loans. The distortion is greater under a soft-information lending regime. Loan 
officers’ career concerns serve as a good disciplinary device to mitigate the agency 
problem.  
    Using a unique dataset from a major national commercial bank that implemented 
an incentive compensation package for half of its loan officers, we are able to test many 
of the model’s predictions. We find that observable risk factors such as Experian scores,   28
LTV, loan amount, term, maturity, and collateral are important for loan officers’ approval 
decisions and predict subsequent loan defaults. Moreover, the internal risk ratings, which 
contain a large amount of soft information, also predict defaults.  
    Motivated by the incentive package, loan officers in the treated group book more 
loans and, in particular, book larger and longer maturity loans, consistent with the 
model’s predictions. These larger and longer maturity loans are more likely to default 
within two years of loan origination, indicating that these are riskier loans on average. 
Using loan officers’ age and tenure as proxies for their career concerns, we find that loan 
officers with greater career concerns are more conservative in their approval decisions, 
and their booked loans have lower default rates. Also consistent with the model, we find 
evidence that loans with a greater amount of soft information are more likely to be 
approved under the incentive scheme. These loans, however, are also more likely to 
default.  
Our research suggests that hardening the soft information used in lending 
decisions will reduce distortion of incentives of piece-rate contracts. Moreover, 
counteracting incentives with more stringent lending standards may also reduce some of 
the agency problems.    29
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Table 1: Performance Metric 
Metric Weighting  Annual  Goal 
Pull-through yield  50%  48% of new money applications 
booked based on applications 
received from January 1-
November 30, 2005. 
Decision Points  25%  1,080 points*   
Application to decision time (% 
met) 
25% 68.5%** 
*Decision points are allocated as follows: (i) Score +  (all products) = 1 point ; (ii) S/L – basic  
(term $500M - $1MM) = 2 points; (iii) S/L  (term $1 - $3MM, lines of credit < $750M) = 3 
points; (iv) S/L – complex  (term > $3MM, lines of credit > $750M) = 5 points; (v) Letters of 
credit (S/L) = 2 points; (vi) Commercial card (S/L) = 2 points 
**Decision time guidelines are as follows: (i) Score + guideline is 3 days; (ii) S/L guideline is 5 
days 
 
Table 2: Incentive Plan 
Total Score  Incentive award 
Less than 80% of goal  No award 
80% of goal  $4,000 + $125 per percentage point above 80% of goal 
100% of goal  $ 6,500 + $150 per percentage point above 100% of goal 
120% of goal  $ 9,500 + $175 per percentage point above 120% of goal 
Notes: A brief description of the incentive plan that outlines the score achievement and incentive 
award for each score band. 
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Table 3a: Descriptive Statistics of Loan Applications – Loan Status 
  2004 (January - December)  2005 (January - December) 
Variable  Control Group  Treated Group  Control Group  Treated Group 
 Mean  Std.  Mean  Std.  Mean Std. Mean Std. 
Number of Loan Requests  6920    7996    7564    7788   
Number of Loans Booked  2192    2548    2744    3680   
Approval  Rate  31.68%    31.87%    36.28%  47.25%  
Number of Defaults  91     107     119     192    
Default  Rate  4.15%    4.20%    4.34%  5.22%  
Avg $ of Loans Requested   $    455,240    $ 336,805    $  426,480   $    378,698    $       454,141   $       369,635   $       444,137   $       381,829  
Avg $ of Loans Booked   $    224,614    $ 279,361    $  216,048   $    229,403    $       253,219   $       257,801   $       312,518   $       404,976  
Days Spent/Loan Requested  1.38  0.85  1.35  0.70  1.32  0.75  1.06  0.53 
 
              
Table 3b:  Descriptive Statistics of Loan Applications – Risk Profile 
  2004 (January - December)  2005 (January - December) 
Variable  Control Group  Treated Group  Control Group  Treated Group 
 Mean  Std.    Mean  Std.   Mean  Std. 
Internal Risk Ratings  5.23  1.84  5.38  1.52  5.44  1.3  4.93  1.53 
Business Score of Applicants  200.86  72.23  195.88  75.87  195.99  75.27  200.36  68.47 
Business Score of Booked Loans  184.87  68.95  186.11  78.92  185.50  93.09  196.09  87.01 
Personal Score of Applicants   731.85  70.31  725.41  68.06  725.91  74.39  728.06  76.72 
Personal Score of Booked Loans  716.69  87.44  718.90  88.58  719.54  98.25  725.77  66.51 
LTV of Applicants  61.28  43.00  65.30 44.03  65.16  46.87 63.05 43.48 
LTV of Booked Loans  72.99  31.48  76.24 30.90  74.90  33.10 84.10 50.10   33
 
 
Notes: Panels a, b, and c outline the loan statistics, risk profile, and collateral requirements for the control and treated samples during and control 
and treatment time period.
Table 3c: Descriptive Statistics of Loan Applications – Collaterals 
  2004 (January - December)  2005 (January - December) 
Variable  Control Group  Treated Group  Control Group  Treated Group 
 Mean  Std.    Mean  Std.  Mean  Std. 
 Avg % of Applicants with Personal Collateral  69%  46%  68%  47%  64%  48%  70%  46% 
 Avg % of Applicants with Business Collateral  25%  44%  26%  44%  28%  45%  24%  43% 
 Avg % of Applicants with No Collateral  5%  23%  6%  24%  8%  28%  6%  24% 
 Avg % of Booked Loans with Personal Collateral  9%  35%  7%  26%  4%  20%  19%  29% 
 Avg % of Booked Loans with Business Collateral  63%  48%  68%  47%  67%  47%  69%  49% 
 Avg % of Booked Loans with No Collateral  27%  42%  25%  44%  28%  45%  11%  46% 
              34
 
Table 3d: Descriptive Statistics of Loan Applications – Loan Size and Maturity 
 
Treated Group: Loan Approval and Performance 
   2004  2005 
Loan Size / Type 
% approval  % rejection  % walk away  % approval  % rejection  % walk 
away 
Big loan (> $700K)  35% 57%  8%  55%  36%  8% 
Medium loan ($250K-$700K)  31% 56%  13%  49%  40% 11% 
Small loan (< $250K)  27% 55%  18%  33%  51% 16% 
Long term loan (Larger than One Year)  32% 55%  13%  52%  36% 12% 




Treated Group: Risk Profile, Collateral 
   2004  2005 
Loan Size / Type 
Personal 
Collateral 
Risk Score   LTV  Personal collateral  Risk Score  LTV 
Big loan (> $700K)  4 717  77  20  713  79 
Medium loan ($250K-$700K)  4 720  74  19  720  84 
Small loan (< $250K)  4 721  72  19  725  89 
Long term loan (Larger than One Year)  4 721  74  20  717  81 
Short term loan (One Year)  4 717  72  19  720  90 
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Table 3d: Statistics of Loan Applications – Loan Size and Maturity (Con’t) 
 
 
Control Group: Approval and Performance 
   2004  2005 
Loan Size / Type 
% approval  % rejection  % walk away  % approval  % rejection  % walk 
away 
Big loan (> $700K)  35% 60%  8%  34%  59%  8% 
Medium loan ($250K-$700K)  31% 56%  13%  30%  57% 13% 
Small loan (< $250K)  27% 56%  18%  26%  57% 17% 
Long term loan (Larger than One Year)  32% 56%  13%  31%  57% 13% 
Short term loan (One Year)  29% 59%  13%  29%  58% 13% 
 
 
Control Group: Risk Profile, Collateral 
   2004  2005 
Loan Size / Type 
Personal 
Collateral 
Risk Score   LTV  Personal collateral  Risk Score  LTV 
Big loan (> $700K)  4 737  74  4  724  73 
Medium loan ($250K-$700K)  4 751  73  4  723  71 
Small loan (< $250K)  4 722  72  4  724  70 
Long term loan (Larger than One Year)  4 727  71  4  752  73 
Short term loan (One Year)  4 739  70  4  730  69 
Notes: Panels d outline the loan approval, performance, and collateral requirements for the control and treated samples during and control and 
treatment time period for a given loan size and type.   36
Table 4a: Demographics of Loan Officers 
 2004  2005 
Variable  Control Group  Treated Group  Control Group  Treated Group 
Total Number of Loan Officers  63  70  65  65 
Gender – Male  58%  68%  59%  74% 
Income $42,363  $42,422  $42,976  $49,019 
Age 43  41  43  37 
Tenure 3.49  3.66  3.58  2.91 
 
 
Table 4b: Percentage of Loan Officers in Each Age Group 
 2004  2005 
Loan Officer Age  Control Group  Treated Group  Control Group  Treated Group 
25-34   22.33  26.92  26.90  33.04 
35-44 24.98  29.07  24.30  37.58 
45-55 31.67  24.66  27.00  21.04 
55+ 21.02  19.35  21.80  8.34 
Notes: Panels a and b outline the loan officer demographics – gender, income, age, tenure, and fraction of loan officers by age groups for the 
control and treated samples during and control and treatment time period for a given loan size and type.   37
Table 5a: Loan Status in the Treated Group for Each Age Group – 2004 
Loan Officer Age  % of Loan Officers  Approval Rate  Loan Size  Credit Scores  Default Rate 
25-34 26.92  34.91  142,029  5.32  3.46 
35-44 29.07  33.01  166,083  5.37  4.36 
45-55 24.66  29.78  211,327  5.4  4.84 
55+ 19.35  26.00  232,022  5.37  4.46 
 
Table 5a: Loan Status in the Treated Group for Each Age Group – 2005 
          
Loan Officer Age  % of Loan Officers  Approval Rate  Loan Size  Credit Scores  Default Rate 
25-34 33.04  56.08  229,116  5.04  4.73 
35-44 37.58  52.70  244,892  4.97  4.74 
45-55 21.04  43.46  328,117  4.89  5.99 
55+ 8.34  40.01  387,727  4.81  6.58 
Notes: Panel a outline the fraction of loan officers by age groups, the approval rates, loan sizes, credit scores, and default for the control and 
treated samples during and control and treatment time period for a given loan size and type. 
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Table 5b: Percentage bookings in the treated group by gender groups – 2004 
         
Loan Officer Gender  % of Loan Officers  Approval Rate  Loan Size  Credit Scores  Default Rate 
Male 68.40  32.28  193,092  5.27  4.51 
Female 31.60  28.41  185,029  5.39 3.71 
 
Table 5b: Percentage bookings in the treated group by gender groups – 2005 
         
Loan Officer Gender  % of Loan Officers  Approval Rate  Loan Size  Credit Scores  Default Rate 
Male 74.30  51.19  299,101  5.03 5.21 
Female 25.70  40.27  280,583  4.79  5.26 
Notes: Panel b outline the fraction of loan officers by gender groups, the approval rates, loan sizes, credit scores, and default for the 
control and treated samples during and control and treatment time period for a given loan size and type. 
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Table 6: Monthly Loan Approval Status 
   Number of Loans in the Treated Group  Number of Loans in the Control Group 
Months  Received  Rejected    Withdraw    Booked    Received  Rejected    Withdraw    Booked    
Jan-04  548 380  69.34%  76  13.87%  92  16.79%  532 252  47.37%  103  19.36%  177  33.27% 
Feb-04  582 346  59.45%  133  22.85%  103  17.70%  531 327  61.58%  78  14.69%  126  23.73% 
Mar-04  688 354  51.45%  71  10.32%  263  38.23%  538 386  71.75%  86  15.99%  66  12.27% 
Apr-04  679 344  50.66%  92  13.55%  243  35.79%  520 258  49.62%  102  19.62%  160  30.77% 
May-04 747  342 45.78%  75  10.04%  330  44.18% 655  217 33.13%  86  13.13%  352  53.74% 
Jun-04  742 344  46.36%  83  11.19%  315  42.45%  644 323  50.16%  78  12.11%  243  37.73% 
Jul-04  759 370  48.75%  76  10.01%  313  41.24%  632 391  61.87%  79  12.50%  162  25.63% 
Aug-04  639 313  48.98%  88  13.77%  238  37.25%  570 301  52.81%  79  13.86%  190  33.33% 
Sep-04  618 401  64.89%  54  8.74%  163  26.38%  553 334  60.40%  89  16.09%  130  23.51% 
Oct-04  649 389  59.94%  107  16.49%  153  23.57%  568 283  49.82%  88  15.49%  197  34.68% 
Nov-04  692 411  59.39%  84  12.14%  197  28.47%  604 371  61.42%  67  11.09%  166  27.48% 
Dec-04  653 416  63.71%  99  15.16%  138  21.13%  573 261  45.55%  89  15.53%  223  38.92% 
Jan-05  584 262  44.86%  93  15.92%  229  39.21%  574 311  54.18%  56  9.76%  207  36.06% 
Feb-05  593 243  40.98%  74  12.48%  276  46.54%  599 310  51.75%  83  13.86%  206  34.39% 
Mar-05  638 204  31.97%  71  11.13%  363  56.90%  637 345  54.16%  98  15.38%  194  30.46% 
Apr-05  531 276  51.98%  73  13.75%  182  34.27%  645 335  51.94%  73  11.32%  237  36.74% 
May-05 764  316 41.36%  57  7.46% 391  51.18% 630  394 62.54%  52  8.25% 184  29.21% 
Jun-05  783 268  34.23%  66  8.43%  449  57.34%  636 333  52.36%  91  14.31%  212  33.33% 
Jul-05  662 249  37.61%  61  9.21%  352  53.17%  604 280  46.36%  93  15.40%  231  38.25% 
Aug-05  642 289  45.02%  74  11.53%  279  43.46%  591 353  59.73%  66  11.17%  172  29.10% 
Sep-05  643 255  39.66%  75  11.66%  313  48.68%  683 284  41.58%  87  12.74%  312  45.68% 
Oct-05  635 258  40.63%  75  11.81%  302  47.56%  639 337  52.74%  68  10.64%  234  36.62% 
Nov-05  688 297  43.17%  87  12.65%  304  44.19%  692 258  37.28%  60  8.67%  374  54.05% 
Dec-05  625 289  46.24%  96  15.36%  240  38.40%  634 378  59.62%  75  11.83%  181  28.55%   40
Table 7a: Loan Acceptance Decisions based on loan characteristics 




Intercept  -4.0768  -2.99       -3.7241  -2.84      
 Internal Risk Ratings  -0.3046  -2.92  -2.93%  **  -0.2837  -2.97  -2.89%  ** 
Experian Business Score  0.2719  16.57  0.27%  **  0.2641  16.82  0.25%  ** 
Experian Borrowers Score  0.1238  13.31  0.30%  **  0.1188  13.36  0.30%  ** 
Loan-to-Value of the Loan  -0.0373  -2.32  -4.06%  **  -0.0344  -2.25  -3.92%  ** 
log(Loan Amount Requested)  -0.0406  -2.07  -5.39%  **  -0.0395  -2.17  -5.15%  ** 
Loan Term  -0.0046  -5.14  -6.49%  **  -0.0042  -4.87  -5.99%  ** 
Loan maturity  0.6106  0.92  0.12%    0.6082  0.98  0.12%   
Treated Dummy  0.6479  0.99  5.21%     0.6124  1.00  4.96%   
2005 Dummy  0.7218  1.07  1.20%     0.6757  1.05  1.13%   
Treated Dummy*2005 Dummy  0.7825  4.36  12.66%  **  0.7109  4.33  12.29%  ** 
Days Spent Per Loan  0.5733  0.87  0.25%    0.5309  0.85  0.24%   
 Internal Risk Ratings * treated Dummy  -0.2282  -0.50  0.13%    -0.2210  -0.52  0.13%   
Experian Business Score * Treated Dummy  0.4988  1.55  -0.18%     0.4945  1.59  -0.18%   
Experian Borrowers Score* Treated Dummy  0.0882  0.26  0.01%     0.0828  0.25  0.01%   
Loan-to-Value of the Loan* Treated Dummy  -0.7004  -1.70  0.01%  *  -0.6704  -1.79  0.01%  * 
log(Loan Amount Requested)* Treated Dummy  -0.5060  -1.34  -0.05%    -0.4795  -1.35  -0.05%   
Loan Term* Treated Dummy  -1.1192  -1.83  -0.03%  *  -1.0905  -1.91  -0.03%  * 
Loan maturity* Treated Dummy  0.4422  1.75  0.08%  *  0.4080  1.66  0.08%   
Days Spent Per Loan* Treated Dummy  0.1436  1.40  0.28%     0.1390  1.44  0.28%   
 Internal Risk Ratings * Treated * 2005  -0.1570  -0.26  -0.11%     -0.1492  -0.24  -0.11%   
Experian Business Score * Treated* 2005  0.4035  0.97  0.21%     0.3675  0.94  0.19%   
Experian Borrowers Score* Treated * 2005  0.2342  0.49  0.25%     0.2110  0.45  0.23%   
Loan-to-Value of the Loan* Treated * 2005  -0.4229  -1.47  -0.29%     -0.3949  -1.41  -0.28%   
log(Loan Amount Requested)* Treated * 2005  0.7490  3.57  2.92%  **  0.7322  3.82  2.87%  ** 
Loan Term* Treated * 2005  -0.1440  -1.09  -0.08%    -0.1320  -1.09  -0.07%   
Loan maturity* Treated * 2005  0.9435  3.81  5.53%  **  0.8917  3.75  5.19%  ** 
Days Spent Per Loan* Treated * 2005  1.7321  6.20  0.06%  **  1.5733  6.24  0.05%  ** 
Personal Collateral  0.5634  3.13  6.41%  **  0.5372  3.11  5.99%  ** 
Business Collateral  0.5669  3.59  3.76%  **  0.5575  3.58  3.52%  ** 
Personal Collateral*Treated Dummy  0.1743  1.41  0.30%     0.1720  1.40  0.29%   
Business Collateral*Treated Dummy  0.2528  1.64  0.25%     0.2296  1.51  0.25%   
Personal Collateral * Treated Dummy*2005 Dummy  0.1785  1.56  0.37%     0.1697  1.51  0.36%   
Business Collateral*Bank A Dummy*2005 Dummy  0.1726  1.32  0.26%     0.1590  1.22  0.25%   
SIC Dummy  Yes        Yes       
Loan Officer Dummy  No        Yes       
Number of Observations  30268             
R-Square 17.28%             
Notes: We report the coefficients, the Std Err, the T-stats and marginal effects for the decision to deny credit (Y = 1). We obtain the 
marginal effects by simply evaluating  Pr xj  at the regressors’ sample means and coefficient estimates . Since the probabilities of 
offering and denying credit sum to 1 the marginal effects for the decision to reject a loan application are simply the opposite of the 
reported ones. The pseudo-R2 is McFadden’s likelihood ratio index.   41
Table 7b: Probability of Loan Default on Loan Characteristics 
Variable  Coeff Val.  Std. Err.  t-stats  Marg Eff    Coeff Val.  Std. Err.  t-stats  Marg Eff   
Intercept  -2.3794  0.9712  -2.45        -2.2942  0.9288  -2.47      
 Internal Risk Ratings  0.1784  0.0426 4.19  8.78% ** 0.1769  0.0395 4.47  8.72% ** 
Experian Business Score  -0.0847  0.0110  -7.71  -0.44%  **  -0.0780  0.0102  -7.60  -0.40%  ** 
Experian Borrowers Score  -0.0847  0.0066  -12.41  -0.59%  **  -0.0809  0.0065  -12.53  -0.53%  ** 
Loan-to-Value of the Loan  0.0517  0.0120  4.30  1.28%  **  0.0482  0.0118  4.09  1.25%  ** 
log(Loan Amount Requested)  0.0289  0.0075  3.87  1.77%  **  0.0263  0.0068  3.88  1.73%  ** 
Loan Term  0.0012  0.0007  1.75  0.03%  *   0.0011  0.0006  1.81  0.03%  * 
Loan maturity  0.4728  0.1168 4.05  6.79% ** 0.4510  0.1080 4.17  6.76% ** 
Treated Dummy  0.0686  0.0716 0.96  0.33%    0.0623 0.0691  0.90 0.32%  
2005 Dummy  0.4781  0.1385 3.45  3.38% ** 0.4522  0.1286 3.51  3.07% ** 
Treated Dummy*2005Dummy  0.4274  0.1073 3.98  6.51% ** 0.4115  0.1059 3.88  5.87% ** 
Days Spent Per Loan  -0.4869  0.1912 -2.55 -1.21% ** -0.4723  0.1796 -2.62  -1.13% ** 
 Internal Risk Ratings * Treated  0.1269  0.0427 2.97  0.10% ** 0.1218  0.0393 3.10  0.09% ** 
Experian Business Score * Treated  -0.0235  0.0225 -1.04 -0.09%    -0.0235 0.0223  -1.00 -0.08%  
Experian Borrowers Score* Treated  -0.5274  0.0531 -9.94  0.02% ** -0.4857  0.0479  -10.14 0.02% ** 
Loan-to-Value of the Loan* Treated  -0.2573  0.0944 -2.27 -0.55% ** -0.2544  0.0913 -2.78  -0.50% ** 
log(Loan Amount Requested)* Treated  -0.0205  0.2780 -0.07  0.00%     -0.0186 0.2597  -0.07 0.00%  
Loan Term* Treated  -0.0645  0.0780 -0.83 -0.01%    -0.0583 0.0722  -0.80 -0.01%  
Loan maturity* Treated  0.6061  0.1711 3.54  3.34% ** 0.5781  0.1623 3.56  3.05% ** 
Days Spent Per Loan* Treated  0.0807  0.0587 1.38  0.01%    0.0760 0.0555  1.36 0.01%  
 Internal Risk Ratings * Treated * 2005  0.2441  0.1755 1.39  0.08%    0.2261 0.1718  1.31 0.08%  
Experian Business Score * Treated * 2005  -0.1005  0.1595 -0.63 -0.06%    -0.0942 0.1485  -0.63 -0.05%  
Experian Borrowers Score* Treated * 2005  -0.3635  0.2916 -1.25 -0.94%    -0.3404 0.2706  -1.25 -0.91%  
Loan-to-Value of the Loan* Treated * 2005  1.4476  0.1115 12.98 -1.82% **  1.3847  0.1015 13.60  -1.68% ** 
log(Loan Amount Requested)* Treated * 2005  0.3568  0.1045 3.41  4.05% ** 0.3356  0.0966 3.47  3.64% ** 
Loan Term* Treated * 2005  0.3231  0.0986 3.28  4.40% ** 0.3066  0.0924 3.31  4.12% ** 
Loan maturity* Treated * 2005  0.8975  0.1839 4.88  9.30% ** 0.8788  0.1808 4.86  9.26% ** 
Days Spent Per Loan* Treated* 2005  -0.2368  0.0746 -3.17 -1.70% ** -0.2330  0.0739 -3.15  -1.56% ** 
Personal Collateral  -1.5637  0.1571 -9.95 -4.91% ** -1.4954  0.1434  -10.42 -4.44% ** 
Business Collateral  -1.8806  0.3037 6.19 -1.29% ** -1.7135  0.2884 -5.94  -1.17% ** 
Personal Collateral*Treated Dummy  -0.2745  0.2659 -1.03 -0.16%    -0.2549 0.2543  -1.00 -0.14%  
Business Collateral*Treated Dummy  -0.1077  0.1029 -1.05 -0.33%    -0.1007 0.0994  -1.01 -0.30%  
Personal Collateral*Treated Dummy*2005 Dummy  -0.1132  0.1702 -0.67 -0.11%    -0.1019 0.1571  -0.64 -0.10%  
Business Collateral*Treated Dummy*2005 Dummy  -0.1453  0.3771 -0.39 -0.35%    -0.1439 0.3409  -0.42 -0.32%  
SIC Dummy  Yes          Yes         
Loan Officer Dummy  No          Yes         
Number of Observations  11164 
R-Square 7.99%                   
  
Notes: We report the coefficients, the Std Err, the T-stats and marginal effects for the decision to default on the credit (Y = 1). We 
obtain the marginal effects by simply evaluating  Pr xj  at the regressors’ sample means and coefficient estimates . Since the 
probabilities of offering and denying credit sum to 1 the marginal effects for the decision to reject a loan application are simply the 
opposite of the reported ones. The pseudo-R2 is McFadden’s likelihood ratio index.  42
Table 8: Loan approval decisions and defaults 
 Acceptance    Default   
Variable Coeff  Val.  t-stats  Marg  Eff   
Coeff 
Val. t-stats  Marg  Eff   
Intercept -4.1326  -2.73        -2.5701 -2.37       
 Internal Risk Ratings  -0.3311  -3.15  -3.25%  **  0.1811 3.93 9.30%  ** 
Experian Business Score  0.2904  16.46  0.28%  **  -0.0932 -7.70 -0.46%  ** 
Experian Borrowers Score  0.1317  13.70  0.30%  **  -0.0920 -13.08 -0.64% ** 
Loan-to-Value of the Loan  -0.0407  -2.24  -4.45%  **  0.0529 4.16 1.32%  ** 
log(Loan Amount Requested)  -0.0415  -2.01  -5.63%  **  0.0305 3.99 1.85%  ** 
Loan Term  -0.0049  -5.28  -6.92%  **  0.0013 1.84 0.04%  * 
Treated Dummy  0.6606  0.94  5.34%    0.0750 0.94 0.36%   
2005 Dummy  0.7966  1.14  1.24%     0.5172 3.38 3.69%  ** 
Treated Dummy*2005 Dummy  0.8250  4.21  13.02%  **  0.4503 3.99 6.77%  ** 
Days Spent Per Loan  0.6328  0.92  0.25%    -0.4917 -2.34 -1.23%  ** 
Loan Officer Gender (Female)  1.0382  1.44  0.14%    -0.6228 -12.00 -4.79% ** 
Loan Officer Age  0.4458  0.68  0.58%    0.1607 2.66 0.27%  ** 
Loan Officer Age(sq)  -0.5601  -0.82  -0.21%    -0.0618 -1.36 -0.21%   
Loan Officer Tenure  0.4179  0.62  0.01%    0.7065 3.18 0.15%  ** 
Loan Officer Tenure (sq)  0.9105  1.39  0.01%    -0.5330 -3.67 -0.60%  ** 
Days Spent Per Loan*Treated Dummy  -0.7350  -1.06  -0.27%    -0.0801 -0.18 -0.06%   
Loan Officer Gender (Female)*Treated Dummy  -1.2078  -1.66  -0.07%    -0.2054 -1.60 -0.01%   
Loan Officer Age*Treated Dummy  0.4993  0.69  0.15%    0.4904 2.78 0.76%  ** 
Loan Officer Age(sq)*Treated Dummy  -0.5918  -0.83  -0.60%    -0.1099 -0.70 -0.10%   
Loan Officer Tenure*Treated Dummy  0.4399  0.56  0.79%    0.3096 2.09 0.16%  ** 
Loan Officer Tenure (sq)*Treated Dummy  1.0422  1.35  0.44%    -0.9549 -3.89 -0.41%  ** 
Days Spent Per Loan*Treated Dummy*2005 Dummy  -1.3716  -1.87  -4.31%  *  -0.5589 -3.17 -2.25%  ** 
Loan Officer Gender (Female)*Treated Dummy*2005 
Dummy -1.9498  -2.53  -8.09%  **  -0.5634 -4.83 -2.68%  ** 
Loan Officer Age*Treated Dummy*2005 Dummy  1.8456  2.62  6.13%  **  0.3650 2.36 2.41%  ** 
Loan Officer Age(sq)*Treated Dummy*2005 Dummy  -1.4044  -1.87  -5.26%  *  -0.2437 -1.15 -0.43%   
Loan Officer Tenure*Treated Dummy*2005 Dummy  2.4137  3.05  7.24%  **  0.9385 2.73 6.77%  ** 
Loan Officer Tenure (sq)*Treated Dummy*2005 Dummy  1.9412  2.80  3.98%  **  -0.7134 -5.68 -1.91%  ** 
Personal Collateral  0.6172  11.71  7.00%  **  -1.6722 -10.52 -5.41% ** 
Business Collateral  0.5948  14.73  3.97%  **  -2.0781 -65.00 -1.35% ** 
Personal Collateral*Treated Dummy  0.1867  1.37  0.30%    -0.2997 -1.00 -0.17%   
Business Collateral*Treated Dummy  0.2620  1.62  0.27%    -0.1158 -1.06 -0.33%   
Personal Collateral*Treated Dummy*2005 Dummy  0.1961  1.60  0.37%    -0.1217 -0.67 -0.11%   
Business Collateral*Treated Dummy*2005 Dummy  0.1857  1.35  0.28%    -0.1531 -0.39 -0.38%   
SIC 2 Digit Dummies  Yes         Yes      
Number of Observations  30268              
R-Square 18.93%              
  
Notes: We report the coefficients, the Std Err, the T-stats and marginal effects for the decision to deny credit (Y = 1). We obtain the 
marginal effects by simply evaluating  Pr xj  at the regressors’ sample means and coefficient estimates . Since the probabilities of 
offering and denying credit sum to 1 the marginal effects for the decision to reject a loan application are simply the opposite of the 
reported ones. The pseudo-R2 is McFadden’s likelihood ratio index. 
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Table 9: Probability of Loan Default with Soft/hard Information 
Variable  Coeff Val.  Std. Err.  t-stats  Marg Eff    Coeff Val.  Std. Err.  t-stats 
Marg 
Eff  
Intercept  -2.3506  0.9608  -2.44        -2.2298  0.9151  -2.43      
 Internal Risk Ratings Residual  0.0703  0.0423 1.66 0.55%     0.0762 0.0384  1.92  0.39%  * 
Experian Business Score  -0.0843  0.0107  -7.87  -0.43%  **  -0.0763  0.0102  -7.49 
-
0.40% ** 
Experian Borrowers Score  -0.0820  0.0064  -12.88  -0.57%  **  -0.0788  0.0065  -12.22 
-
0.51% ** 
Loan-to-Value of the Loan  0.0498  0.0116  4.31  1.24%  **  0.0467  0.0116  4.01  1.21%  ** 
log(Loan Amount Requested)  0.0278  0.0072  3.83  1.71%  **  0.0253  0.0067  3.80  1.72%  ** 
Loan Term  0.0012  0.0007  1.78  0.03%  *   0.0011  0.0006  1.80  0.03%  * 
Loan maturity  0.4560  0.1148 3.97 6.75% ** 0.4366  0.1043 4.18 6.71%  ** 
Treated Dummy  0.0664  0.0692 0.96 0.32%    0.0607 0.0686  0.88  0.31%   
2005 Dummy  0.4622  0.1375 3.36 3.27% ** 0.4479  0.1265 3.54 3.06%  ** 
Treated Dummy*2005Dummy  0.4220  0.1048 4.02 6.37% ** 0.4042  0.1042 3.87 5.76%  ** 
Days Spent Per Loan  -0.4770  0.1875 -2.54 -1.18% ** -0.4550  0.1770 -2.57 
-
1.12% ** 
 Internal Risk Ratings Residual* Treated  0.1066  0.0425 2.51 3.10% ** 0.1001  0.0389 2.57 4.09%  ** 
Experian Business Score * Treated  -0.0228  0.0225 -1.01 -0.09%    -0.0228 0.0222  -1.02 
-
0.08%  
Experian Borrowers Score* Treated  -0.5116  0.0530 -9.64 0.02%  **  -0.4817  0.0463  -10.39 0.02% ** 
Loan-to-Value of the Loan* Treated  -0.2480  0.0943 -2.62 -0.54% ** -0.2465  0.0895 -2.75 
-
0.50% ** 
log(Loan Amount Requested)* Treated  -0.0203  0.2680 -0.07 0.00%     -0.0180  0.2576  -0.06  0.00%   
Loan Term* Treated  -0.0640  0.0750 -0.85 -0.01%    -0.0580 0.0721  -0.80 
-
0.01%  
Loan maturity* Treated  0.5935  0.1668 3.55 3.31% ** 0.5591  0.1601 3.49 2.93%  ** 
Days Spent Per Loan* Treated  0.0805  0.0566 1.42 0.01%    0.0760 0.0549  1.38  0.01%   
 Internal Risk Ratings Residual * Treated * 2005  0.1840  0.0532 3.46 0.08%  **  0.1985 0.0692  2.87  0.08%  ** 
Experian Business Score * Treated * 2005  -0.0968  0.1560 -0.62 -0.06%    -0.0926 0.1430  -0.64 
-
0.05%  
Experian Borrowers Score* Treated * 2005  -0.3560  0.2805 -1.26 -0.91%    -0.3347 0.2641  -1.26 
-
0.88%  
Loan-to-Value of the Loan* Treated * 2005  1.4024  0.1074 13.06 -1.78% **  1.3457  0.0981 13.71 
-
1.65% ** 
log(Loan Amount Requested)* Treated * 2005  0.3429  0.1009 3.39 4.04% ** 0.3302  0.0958 3.44 3.62%  ** 
Loan Term* Treated * 2005  0.3136  0.0956 3.28 4.37% ** 0.2970  0.0897 3.31 4.10%  ** 
Loan maturity* Treated * 2005  0.8749  0.1828 4.78 9.18% ** 0.8773  0.1756 4.99 9.12%  ** 
Days Spent Per Loan* Treated* 2005  -0.2274  0.0719 -3.16 -1.65% ** -0.2321  0.0724 -3.20 
-
1.52% ** 
Personal Collateral  -1.5421  0.1562 -9.87 -4.80% ** -1.4719  0.1416 -10.39 
-
4.32% ** 
Business Collateral  -1.8410  0.3001 -6.13 -1.28% ** -1.6782  0.2866 -5.85 
-
1.12% ** 
Personal Collateral*Treated Dummy  -0.2715  0.2566 -1.05 -0.15%    -0.2501 0.2538  -0.98 
-
0.14%  
Business Collateral*Treated Dummy  -0.1038  0.1022 -1.01 -0.32%    -0.0979 0.0994  -0.98 
-
0.30%  
Personal Collateral*Treated Dummy*2005 Dummy  -0.1099  0.1656 -0.66 -0.11%    -0.1015 0.1537  -0.66 
-
0.10%  
Business Collateral*Treated Dummy*2005 Dummy  -0.1440  0.3753 -0.38 -0.34%    -0.1427 0.3400  -0.41 
-
0.31%  
SIC Dummy  Yes          Yes         
Loan Officer Dummy  No          Yes         
Number of Observations  11164           
 
    
 
 
R-Square 8.27%                     44
Notes: We report the coefficients, the Std Err, the T-stats and marginal effects for the decision to default on credit (Y = 1). We obtain 
the marginal effects by simply evaluating  Pr xj  at the regressors’ sample means and coefficient estimates . Since the probabilities of 
offering and denying credit sum to 1 the marginal effects for the decision to reject a loan application are simply the opposite of the 
reported ones. The pseudo-R2 is McFadden’s likelihood ratio index.  45
Table 10:  Comparison of Hard- vs. Soft-information Lending 
  Approval rate    Default rate 
Ratio of Highest/Lowest 








Control group  1.27  1.29    1.16  1.12 




Table 11: Welfare Analysis 
 2005  2004  Remarks 
Average loan size  $312,518  $216,048   
# of loans booked  3680  2548   
Increased volume  $599,575,936    Average loan size × ∆ loans booked 
∆ Fees generated  $11,991,519    2% × increased volume 
Average income  $49,019  $42,422   
Increased wages  $428,805    ∆ Average income × # of loan officers 
# of defaults  192  107   
Defaulted loans  $60,003,456  $23,117,136  Average loan size  × # of defaults  
∆ Loss given default  $18,443,160    50% × ∆ defaulted loans 
      
∆ Welfare =  ∆ Fees generated – Increased wages – ∆ Loss given default =  -$6,880,446 
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